See your public IP and location, run a WebRTC leak test, and read your browser fingerprint. Everything below runs in your browser. Nothing is sent to us.
The GPS-level location from your device. It only runs if you allow it.
That gap usually means WebRTC is exposing your real IP past a VPN. Here is how to close it:
about:config and set media.peerconnection.enabled to false. This turns WebRTC off entirely, so browser calls stop working too..local address?Modern browsers hide your true local IP behind an mDNS hostname, a random value ending in .local, so sites cannot fingerprint your home network. That is expected and good. The public IP is the one that matters for a leak, and if it shows "none exposed" you are fine.
No. On its own it identifies your browser, not you personally. The risk is tracking: a distinctive fingerprint, say an unusual GPU plus a rare font set, lets a site recognise you on a return visit without any cookie. As an example, an ad network can link your two visits and build a profile even after you clear your cookies. Running a common browser on default settings, or an anti-fingerprint browser, makes you blend in with more people and lowers that risk.
For ordinary web requests, yes. When you load a site through a proxy or VPN, the site sees the proxy IP instead of yours. The catch is that other parts of your browser can go around it. As an example, you connect through a VPN with a Frankfurt exit, but a WebRTC call still reaches a STUN server directly and reports your real home IP. DNS queries can leak the same way, IPv6 can slip past a VPN that only covers IPv4, and a proxy set for one browser leaves the rest of your system on your real connection.
A proxy reroutes the traffic of one app or browser through another IP, and most proxies add no encryption. A VPN encrypts all of your device traffic and sends it through a tunnel to one server, so every app is covered, not only the browser. Tor is built for anonymity: it wraps your traffic in layers of encryption and bounces it through three volunteer relays, so no single relay knows both who you are and where you are going. In practice a proxy is the lightest option, a VPN is the everyday privacy tool, and Tor gives up speed for the strongest anonymity.
The labels describe how much a proxy gives away. A transparent proxy passes your real IP straight through in a header such as X-Forwarded-For, so it hides nothing. School and office networks often run these. An anonymous proxy strips your IP but still sends headers that mark the traffic as coming through a proxy, so a site can tell you are on one even if it cannot see who. An elite, or high-anonymity, proxy also removes those headers, so the request looks like a plain home user. For example, a transparent proxy might send X-Forwarded-For: 76.214.168.24, an anonymous one sends a Via header with no real IP, and an elite one sends neither.
Several things can cause it. The most common is a WebRTC leak, which the test above catches. DNS requests can leak to your internet provider while your web traffic uses the VPN. An IPv6 address can bypass a VPN that only tunnels IPv4. A transparent proxy forwards your IP in a header. And a proxy set up for one browser leaves apps and background services on your real connection. Check them in that order, starting with the WebRTC result on this page.
No. A proxy or VPN changes the IP a site sees and nothing else. Your Canvas image, your WebGL GPU string, your audio hash, your fonts, your screen size and your user agent all stay the same, so a site can still recognise the same browser on two visits even when the IP changes each time. Reducing fingerprinting needs a different tool, such as the Tor Browser, an anti-detect browser, or settings that block Canvas and WebGL.
Often, yes, and it does not even need the IP on a blocklist. Datacenter ranges are registered to hosting companies like AWS or DigitalOcean, so their network number alone marks them as non-residential. Transparent proxies give themselves away in headers. Deeper signals expose a tunnel even when headers look clean: the TLS handshake fingerprint called JA3 or JA4, the order of HTTP/2 frames, and TCP settings such as window size can all disagree with the operating system your browser claims to run. Residential and mobile proxy IPs are much harder to spot, because they look like ordinary home connections.
Runs entirely in your browser. No server, nothing stored. Your public IP and its location come from public APIs so the page can show you your own address. DNS and TLS or JA4 leaks are not tested here, because they need a server.